Reply to Norian's "Evolution of the Rawlsian Ideal"

A week ago, Norian posted on the biologically evolutionary roots of the the cultural idea of social justice. Specifically, he discussed Rawls's conception of social justice, including the difference principle, which states that the most just society is that in which inequalities benefit the least well-off individuals. His write-up works well for even the condition of material adequacy held up (if discreetly) by libertarian thinkers like Rand and Hayek. Norian asks, "Why would anyone but the poorest in society advocate the welfare state?" At the end, he poses, "Is the most just system that which is most evolutionarily advantageous to its members?"

To answer Norian's closing question, we first have to define "evolutionarily advantageous." One definition is: "Facilitates an individual to produce more high-quality offspring than his/her peers."

Thinking about selection on the level of the individual, Norian's question appears a bit silly. By "its members," I assume he is referring to all citizens of a society. By definition, an evolutionarily advantageous society is one that loads the die in favor of some individuals over others. An "evolutionarily advantageous" society of 100 people cannot be advantageous for all 100. Therefore, it seems at first that no society, no matter how just, would be evolutionarily advantageous to all its members.

But Norian is a smart guy. As he hints in the last paragraph, he's probably looking to higher levels of selection (i.e. the group) when making his inquiry. Indeed, concepts of justice (such as Rawls's) emphasize society as a functional unit. Merely asking the question, "What makes a society just?" suggests that our minds have evolved in the context of selective pressures not just on the individual, but on the group as a unit. If this were the case, then our conception of a just society would be genetically tailored by a history of successful, tight-knit societies that out-competed others in reproductive terms. Consequently, a society functioning on that conception of justice would furnish that society with reproductive advantages over other societies. In this way, "the most just system" could be the "most evolutionarily advantageous."

In support of a group-selectionist argument, Norian writes (with the tip of his tongue in his cheek, I'm sure):

I know what you're thinking. No, if you're one of those people who hears the word 'group-selection' and laughs, you understand nothing about evolutionary biology. They're called different levels of selection, and yes, society exhibits heritability, variation and selection. The science that comes out in the next ten years is going to blow your mind.

Ok, so I don't laugh when I hear the word "group-selection," but in my mind I make the sound that you make when someone tells you a rather shocking bit of news while you're drinking a tall glass of chocolate milk. That's what I think most group-selection arguments are: delicious chocolate milk tragically gone down the trachea instead of the esophagus. It's a good idea, and Norian is right in saying that it can happen. The more vital question is, "Did it happen?"

I doubt that the differential success of ancient hunter-gatherer groups (as units) has much to do with our conception of justice. A lot of the results that one would expect from group selection can be wrought from selection on the individual in a group environment. Since humans are such social creatures, it makes sense that the enhanced (or diminished) reproductive fitness of an enterprising individual will naturally extend to humans of the same group through practices such as imitation. If a young genius invents the wheel, her whole society may benefit. That is not to say, though, that she invents the wheel "for the good of society" in any remote way.

Humans are cooperators. Good cooperators -- people who have entrusted their reproductive success in part to the actions of others -- have prevailed in the struggle for survival. Humans' adaptability is the reason why they have overrun the world.

My theory is that, by looking to improve the lot of its least well-off members, the most just society would be potentially evolutionarily advantageous at some hybrid level between individual and group. By lifting up the poor, a just society produces a group of more useful cooperators. In turn, individuals of all echelons stand to benefit over other individuals by cooperating more effectively than their peers. Through imitation and trade, these benefits come to all individuals, and the playing field starts to level out again. A just society is "evolutionarily advantageous" because it facilitates productive inequalities. These inequalities translate into reproductive benefits for certain individuals over others. The group is instrumental rather than an end unto itself.

Daydreaming prompt: Response

A month ago, I proposed a simple daydreaming prompt. It boils down to this: You can save yourself and nine fellow humans and set up a colony on Mars. The questions are:
1. Who will you bring with you?
2. What will you bring with you?
3. What institutions will you institute in the new colony?
Here are my answers, for the time being:

1. Who will you bring? (This is basically trying to beat natural selection against humanity by thinking a thousand steps ahead.)

First, I will bring my girlfriend (duh). I will fill in the remaining 8 slots based on these criteria:

4 males, 4 females. This 1:1 ratio will accomplish many things:

• Maximize the number of genes inherited by future generations. Heterozygosity (i.e. mutt-character) tends to correlate positively with the health and resilience of organisms, ideal for these do-or-die settlements.
• Minimize the risk of failure. For instance, if I decided to fill the ship with women, and I turned out to be sterile, we'd be in quite the bind.
• More even sex ratios in future generations. Sex ratios tend to be 1:1, but some individuals may have more of a tendency to produce one sex than another. An even number of males and females in the parent generation would be most likely to produce even ratios in future generations.

Maximum genetic heterozygosity (for aforementioned reasons). This could be measured directly through genetic analysis or be looking at phenotypic features such as:

• Body type (Height, BMI, etc.)
  
• Ethnic history
• Hair/eye color
• etc.

Minimum risk of illness. I would choose against individuals with histories of past illness or with family histories of past heritable illness. I would go for people with good eyesight and hearing, too.

Same language (English or Spanish, given what I speak). Hopefully, this would maximize cultural cohesion and cooperation.

Same religion. Also to increase cooperation, especially among men. Religiosity tends to act as a stabilizing force in small communities. (If this weren't the case, I doubt religion ever would have caught on.)

Problem-solving skills/creativity, probably measured by IQ and/or artistic skill. This will be important given the number of problems will face on Mars. (Oh boy, my palms are sweating just thinking about it!)

2. What will you bring?
Of course, I will bring copious amounts of water. I will also bring gas-tight buckets and giant straws for the collection and condensation of polar water.
Food is a must, at least for a while. Potentially, seeds could become a renewable resource in Mars's more-or-less fertile soil. (At least asparagus?) I could maybe bring some earthworms to enrich the soil with nitrogen.
Maybe I'd toss in a Playstation 2 and Grand Theft Auto: Vice City, too.

3. What institutions would lead to the prosperity of the colony?
I would start with non-coercive anarchy. However, there would be two enforced requirements:

1. Respect the rights of others, in accordance with a basic Bill of Rights.
2. Pray.

A formal intervention of some sorts would need to be enacted to address individuals not complying with these requirements.

The first is important, simply because we do not want to kill each other or get in petty fights. I don't think my comrades or I would disrespect each other, though, at least not at first, because our survival would hinge on our cooperation.

The second is important to prevent existential crises. If one really got down to thinking about it, one might be tempted to abandon this whole humanity thing for good. I am, however, a believer in human life's intrinsic good. I believe that suicide is wrong in most circumstances, probably including the circumstances in which a Martian colonist might find herself. By pointing to a higher power, directionlessness, powerlessness, and overall disillusion might be prevented. (For a case study in how Christmas saved a fictitious Martian colony, watch this.)

Other than that, anarchy would probably fit the bill for the first few decades. The Bill of Rights will also suffice for that time and onward into the future (hopefully).


What's your answer? What did I forget? What shouldn't I have included?

Evolution of the Rawlsian Ideal

Why should the best social system be that which is most advantageous to the least well off? Why would anyone but the poorest in society advocate the welfare state? Why have social safety nets?

For the least well off in society these are no-brainers. But what about for the rich- why would someone in the upper financial echelons of society advocate a welfare state? Do humans have an deeply ingrained cultural sense of empathy and compassion driving them to be altruistic, or are there direct benefits to be gained as well?

One could claim that the rich are afraid they could someday become poor, that the safety nets are a form of insurance. This seems rather unlikely. What about the opposite argument that the rich are completely selfless and support the welfare state even though they have absolutely nothing to gain. This hypothesis leaves just as much to be desired.

One could argue that the poor are just as essential as the rich to society. Without the poor, everyone in society essentially shifts down a notch- imagine society without any of the lowest paying jobs- no factory workers, no mall-cops, no CVS employees, not to mention janitors, trashmen and the other invisible jobs which make society function. It's to everyone's advantage to make society "function", and by and large this means supporting those at the low end of the financial spectrum.

A sociobiologist might evoke a form of societal selection, saying individuals work for the good of society as well as looking out for themselves. I know what you're thinking. No, if you're one of those people who hears the word 'group-selection' and laughs, you understand nothing about evolutionary biology. They're called different levels of selection, and yes, society exhibits heritability, variation and selection. The science that comes out in the next ten years is going to blow your mind.

A sociologist might say that the concept of reputation is at stake. Individuals who are openly altruistic will benefit from getting good reputations, and those who are seemingly selfish (like the miserly fool who rejects the welfare state or the rich man who doesn't give to charity) will suffer from the bad reputations they accrue.

What about the student of animal behavior? She might invoke the Handicap Principle, going as far as to say that philanthropists are showing off, essentially proving that they can get along just fine in society even after giving away large sums of money. This is why peacocks have such elaborate tails and why certain types of gazelles stot, or jump, when chased by a predator instead of directly running away- they are in both cases proving that they are superior to other conspecifics, whether the goal is mate attraction or to make the predator give up and pursue someone weaker. Is this type of human altruism just a showy handicap?

Regardless of which hypothesis you're partial to (and there are many more yet unnamed), it is very unlikely that affluent people would pursue social safety nets were it not somehow to their benefit. Even if this is purely a cultural construct, our brains were created through evolution and there are constraints on what we are likely to think and which ideas we are likely to find appealing. The excuse of human exceptionalism through culture falters, falls and tumbles down the hill. Are social safety nets just? Are they a good idea? The fact that we're even thinking about them means they might be advantageous (the view of an evolutionary psychologist, maybe? ;)

One last idea: is the most just system that which is most evolutionarily advantageous to its members? Remember your levels of selection and the question grows infinitely more interesting.

Neolithic (R)evolution: By Choice Or By Need?

In a political science course at Brown University this spring, philosopher Jason Brennan presented the neolithic revolution as an opportunity to engage in trade. As part of a hypothesis about the Neanderthal extinction, Brennan introduced the idea of Homo sapiens coming to dominance through the establishment of trade and the advent of agriculture. Few would contest the fact that the neolithic revolution led to a transition from hunter-gatherer lifestyles to more stable sedentary societies, and that this transition was the gateway for market economics, technology, and cultural advancement.

Yet the way professor Brennan posed the question was to ask how exactly our hominid ancestors were able to make this transition, and what factors allowed them to finally make this obviously beneficial transition. But was the neolithic revolution truly based on a novel idea which led to such momentous change, or is it more accurate to say that necessity was the mother of this invention.

The move to agriculture happened all over the globe within a very limited timescale. It is exceedingly unlikely that someone suddenly realized that planting crops would be a good idea, and that the neolithic revolution is simply the spread of this idea. People tended to crops long before they began planting them. The first forms of irrigation were simple modifications of the landscape in order to divert water to patches of desirable plants. People knew about irrigation and the raising of crops long before the agricultural revolution began.

So why wait? Why did the neolithic revolution happen all of a sudden across the globe. I think it was a matter of necessity. As our ancestors proliferated and expanded across the globe, a phenomenon called the Pleistocene Extinctions occured- this was the mass extinction of megafauna which occured in the period leading up to around 10,000 years ago. Although there is controversy, these extinctions were most likely due to overhunting by humans. From moose to mammoths to giant beavers, much of the world's large mammal population was decimated, leaving few large animals to hunt and gather.

Agriculture is really not that much of a good thing. Taking care of crops restricts you to eating only very few types of plants, as opposed to the hundreds of types available to hunter-gatherers. This makes crops easily subject to disease, not to mention the risk of soil demineralization. Any animals that were raised were in close proximity to humans, and many of the world's worst disease have arisen precisely when the disease spreads from animals to humans (think avian flue, swine flue, and bubonic plague for starters). Additionally, by adopting a sedentary lifestyle our ancestors lived in close proximity to their feces, also increasing the risk of disease exposure.

So in the end, was the neolithic revolution a wonderous idea which finally enabled hunter-gathering Homo sapiens to embrace its destiny of trade, economics, and structured society, or was it simply a choice of the lesser of two evils, making the best of a lousy situation when animal food supplies were running short? It is important to consider the past when examining the present, but it is equally important to fully understand the past which we seek to consider.

Gold Pins

In "Notes from Underground," Fyodor Dostoevsky writes:

They say that Cleopatra (excuse an instance from Roman history) was fond of sticking gold pins into her slave-girls' breasts and derived gratification from their screams and writhings. You will say that that was in the comparatively barbarous times; that these are barbarous times too, because also, comparatively speaking, pins are stuck in even now; that though man has now learned to see more clearly than in barbarous ages, he is still far from having learnt to act as reason and science would dictate. But yet you are fully convinced that he will be sure to learn when he gets rid of certain old bad habits, and when common sense and science have completely re-educated human nature and turned it in a normal direction. You are confident that then man will cease from INTENTIONAL error and will, so to say, be compelled not to want to set his will against his normal interests.

David Brooks could well be the "you" to whom Dostoevsky's apocraphyl speaker addresses this segment of his diary. In "The Sandra Bullock Trade," Brooks argues that "most of us pay attention to the wrong things," such as making money, even though tending to our social and spiritual careers is a far more efficient way to achieve happiness than focusing on our economic careers. Like Dostoevsky's narrator's audience, Brooks is confident in science's ability to turn human nature in a rational, "normal direction," namely, toward the productive pursuit of happiness. He calls those who would consider trading social welfare for economic welfare for "more than three seconds" "absolutely crazy."

As Dostoevsky points out, however, the columnist's rational, science-backed vision of how to produce prosperity makes some questionable assumptions, such as:

1. Happiness = prosperity.


2. People want to be happy.


3. People want to prosper.


4. People will rationally pursue what they want.

Cleopatra did some irrationally cruel things to make herself happy. I'm guessing that Brooks would label her as "absolutely crazy." If he could go back in time, he might even offer her some advice, like telling her that "being married produces a psychic gain equivalent to more than $100,000 a year." Or maybe he at least would have advised her not to marry her brother(s).

It is not that any of the advice Brooks gives is wrong, and I don't doubt the "impressive rigor" of the research on which it is based. But if Cleopatra were so crazy, why would she heed it? By the same token, why would people who are looney enough to choose an Oscar over a healthy marriage -- or commit themselves to a comparably irrational course of action -- take Brooks's recommendations to heart? As Dostoevsky suggests, creatures who err intentionally in the present have no reason to do otherwise in the future. If Brooks already thinks that we pay attention to the wrong things, could we "be compelled" by logical argument "not to want to set [our] will against [our] normal interests"?

This is not to stay that humans cannot put their gold pins in a drawer for a while and behave more in their self-interests and in the interests of others. Reforms like the Civil Rights Act can produce just this effect. In the end, though, any meaningful road to prosperous, rational human society must be paved by science that seeks to understand the proximate and ultimate foundations on which human behavior and psychology are built and by which they are constrained. The goal should not be Brooks's analysis, which tries to uproot "absolutely crazy" psychology; instead, we should endeavor to understand the biology from which constraints to rationality originate and work with the constraints toward psychological freedom, not against them or indifferently to them.

(Paradoxically, assuming irrationality, there's no good reason to expect anyone to take up this noble task, or that it is noble to begin with... though some already have.)

We'll always have gold pins. Let's learn how to use them right.

Merrill Lynch, the Marxists?

I missed the 10:25 pm train, so I was stranded in South Station until the midnight train to Providence. Bummer. Good thing I had my work with me. I sat down at one of the many small tables facing the giant train schedule that hung from the high ceiling.

Every few weeks, South Station -- the whole thing -- adopts a new advertising campaign. A couple months ago, ads for Windows 7 overwhelmed the station. In the past few weeks, Merrill Lynch, the financial consulting firm has taken over. (And by Merrill Lynch, I mean Bank of America, which has recently absorbed the company.)

The ads are really peculiar. They feature men and women (with their heads cut out of the picture) in an office space holding signs that read: "Help 2 retire _________." In the blank space are a word or two -- maybe written by the worker holding the signs -- like "hesitation," "guesswork," "indecision," "distraction," "the rat race," and "the 6 am train."

It would not have been out of place had Merrill Lynch thrown up some signs that said, "Help 2 retire 'alienation,'" or, "Help 2 retire 'the bourgeoisie.'" The company is portraying indecision, distraction, and hesitation as predicaments exclusive to the capitalist worker. The campaign taps into an ubiquitous sentiment that work -- and capitalism in general -- is a necessary evil, but an evil nonetheless. This is ironic coming from Merrill Lynch, the brokerage firm whose name has come to be synonymous with corporate greed.

There is an ambiguity here, though. Some of the signs could be referring to retiring from hesitation and indecision in the process of thinking about retirement, whereas others are referring to retirement from the commute to work every morning. Even if the messages were intended by Merrill Lynch to be distinct, the juxtaposition of images makes it so that the ads appeal to the idea that work is the root of most people's problems.

What does Merrill Lynch's campaign imply for democratic capitalism as a set of institutions meant to bring about general prosperity? If work within these institutions breeds psychological and physical discord, what is the point?

But this is probably looking at the issue the wrong way. Maybe we should assume that people under any set of institutions generally dislike working and would rather not be working. Marx was right: people typically don't like laboring for money. Marx idealized the act of working at one's "life-activity," though. Work "can be pretty stressful," even for those who take (disturbing) delight in their vocation, like the cheerful communist farmers.

It is most likely that, by incentivizing work, institutions of capitalism make being productive as attractive and fun as possible. For many people, work still isn't much fun, even with capitalistic institutions firmly in place. We can only imagine what it's like to work in the absence of institutions like private property. Probably doubleplusungood.

Megan McArdle is smart

From http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2010/03/19/DI2010031903563.html

Appleton, WI: Megan, since you support some form of income redistribution, and seem to support some form of health income supplementation, what is it that this bill gets the most wrong? Or is it simply its irresponsible long-term budget? This seems like an entitlement you support, if there were more first-dollar consumer discretion and funding. Do you really feel in all honesty that this bill will do more long-term harm to medicine than it will do short-term good, with the rate at which technology advances? I just don't see how the poor currently overeconomizing on health care is a positive curb on the system. Please help me agree with you that the bill isn't worth it over any time span.

Megan McArdle: One of the hardest problems that economists deal with is how to weight the interests of future people. The problem is, there are so damn many of them (we hope!). Because the number of people who will be alive in the future is so much larger than the number who are alive now, straight utilitarian calculus can easily lead you to say that people alive now should give up 90% of their income to do anything that increases the income of future people by a penny a year.

The natural answer is to discount the utility of people in the future--in much the way that you discount your own future utility, so that someone has to pay you (interest) in order to get you to defer consumption.

Unfortunately, because the future is very long, even a low discount rate ultimately means that you put basically no weight on people who are alive beyond about 50-100 years from now.

This is a big dilemma for environmental economics, and I think it is also a dilemma here. I am fairly skeptical of the claims that this bill will save thousands, or tens of thousands, of lives a year. (see here: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/03/myth-diagnosis/7905/) But even if you think this is true, placing any value at all on the lives of people in the future means that if you save those lives by causing even a small reduction in the rate of innovation (through price controls or regulation), you will end up killing far, far more people than you save. Compound interest is a killer.

I hope that's not too abstract and boring. It's a really tough, really interesting problem, and at some level, it's simply a value judgement about how to weigh the lives of current and future people.

But I'll note that both sides do this very inconsistently: the left wants a high weight on current lives and a low weight for future lives in analyzing health care, but wants to reverse this for the environment; the right takes the opposite stance. Or, in many cases, they simply deny that there is any possible tradeoff between current and future welfare. I find those denials pretty unconvincing--which is one of the reasons I'm for a carbon tax, and against this legislation. There's also the fiscal problem, which I've addressed in other questions.